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Abstract
This paper proposes a mechanism design approach, capable of endogenizing a
monopolist’s choice between selling and renting in a non-anonymous durable goods
setting with short-term commitment. Allowing for mechanisms that determine the
good’s allocation not only at the beginning but also at the end of a given period,
we show that the profit-maximizing mechanism features screening by mode of trade.
By selling to high types while renting to low types, the monopolist overcomes the
obstacles encountered by intertemporal price discrimination and induces immediate
separation of types for arbitrary low priors.
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1 Introduction
Coase’s (1972) seminal insight, that a seller’s tendency to cut prices for previously unsold
units erodes his ability to screen customers, serves as foundation for the durable-goods
literature.1 The idea that the Coase-problem might be overcome, and monopoly power
be restored, by renting rather than selling (Bulow, 1982) features prominently in this
literature as it provides justification (retrospect) for several antitrust rulings against rent-
only monopolists.2 In anonymous markets, renting mitigates a monopolist’s propensity
to cut prices by eliminating the negative selection associated with a sale. However, with
the rise of digital commerce and personalized pricing, markets have become increasingly
non-anonymous and renting faces a problem similar to the one identified by Coase; the
monopolist’s tendency to increase rentals tomorrow for customers renting today. With
non-anonymous customers, this so called ratchet effect makes screening even harder to
achieve under renting than under selling (Hart and Tirole, 1988).
Recent advances in dynamic mechanism design by Bester and Strausz (2001, 2007) and
Doval and Skreta (2019a) allow us to examine whether a monopolist’s ability to screen
customers can be enhanced via the use of mechanisms more sophisticated than simple
price-posting. While, in selling frameworks, general mechanisms turn out to have no bite
(Skreta, 2006; Doval and Skreta, 2019b), in renting frameworks they improve screening
via randomization (Beccuti and Mo¨ller, 2018). However, in both settings the conclusion
remains, that screening is prohibitively costly when the monopolist’s prior expectations
about his customers’ willingness to pay are low.
In this article, we challenge this view by arguing that the monopolist’s inability to
discriminate customers results from the restrictions on the monopolist’s mode of trade,
imposed by the common definition of the set of feasible allocations. For this purpose,
we extend the standard approach to mechanism design with short-term commitment by
allowing for mechanisms that specify not only a likelihood of allocating the product to the
consumer but also a likelihood of returning the product to the monopolist.3 Endogenizing
the monopolist’s choice between selling and renting in this simple yet generic way, allows
us to identify situations in which the profit-maximizing trading mechanism consists of
1Formalizations of Coase’s insight are provided by Stokey (1981), Gul et al. (1986), and
Ausubel and Deneckere (1989).
2United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp. case 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953) served as the
basis for court orders against AT&T, IBM, and Xerox to offer products not only for rental but also for
sale.
3Existing models assume the likelihood of return to be exogenous and equal to either one (rent-
ing frameworks, e.g. Hart and Tirole, 1988; Beccuti and Mo¨ller, 2018) or zero (selling frameworks, e.g.
Fudenberg et al., 1983; Sobel and Takahashi, 1983; Skreta, 2006; Doval and Skreta, 2019b).
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screening by mode of trade. By selling to some consumer-types while renting to others
the monopolist is able to reduce his costs of eliciting consumers’ private information to
the extent that screening becomes optimal for arbitrarily low priors.
In Section 2 we introduce our model of a dynamic, non-anonymous durable goods
market with short-term commitment. In each of two periods, a single, risk-neutral con-
sumer has unit demand for a durable product.4 The consumer’s per-period valuation of
the product can take two values, is constant across time, and constitutes the consumer’s
private information, i.e. his type. The product is provided by a risk-neutral, monopo-
listic supplier with zero cost. In every period, the supplier can offer a mechanism. A
mechanism elicits a message from the consumer, determining a monetary transfer and
the probabilities of allocating the product to the consumer at the beginning of the period
and of returning the product to the supplier at the end.5 The supplier’s lack of (long-
term) commitment is captured by the assumption that mechanisms can specify transfers
and (re)allocation-probabilities only for the current period and that, in every period, the
supplier’s offer must be sequentially optimal.
We allow for the possibility that, with positive probability, the market breaks down in
between periods, impeding further interaction between the two parties. Market breakdown
is a key feature of our model as it makes (repeated) renting different from selling by
jeopardizing potential future gains from trade. It may result from trade embargoes or
the introduction of prohibitively high tariffs, or be simply due to a deterioration of the
business relationship that obstructs further trade between the supplier and the consumer.6
Following the formulation and discussion of the dynamic mechanism design problem in
Section 4, we provide a characterization of the monopolist’s revenue maximizing trading
mechanism in Section 5. Screening by mode of trade – selling to the high type and renting
to the low type – turns out to be a feature of the optimal mechanism.7 Screening by
mode of trade arises when the monopolist is patient, in that he discounts future payoffs
less strongly than the consumer. Arguably, the case of a patient supplier is relevant,
4Our model allows for the interpretation of a continuum of non-anonymous consumers. Importantly,
the same (set of) consumer(s) is present in all periods. This distinguishes us from the literature study-
ing the effects of consumers arriving over time (Conlisk et al., 1984; Board, 2008; Deb and Said, 2015;
Garrett, 2016).
5In practice, a mechanism can be implemented via a menu of contracts, specifying (re-)allocation
probabilities and transfers, with contract-choice determined by the consumer’s message.
6Disputes between landlords and tenants are frequent in housing markets and there is evidence that
the share of rentals increases in the efficiency of courts (Casas-Arce and Saiz, 2010).
7While most of our analysis focuses on the (more interesting) case where the supplier’s prior is low,
we complete our characterization of the optimal mechanism in Section 8. For high priors, the optimal
mechanism posts either a rental or a sale price but never employs both modes of trade in combination.
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because firms may have access to cheaper credit (Hirshleifer, 1958), and consumers might
be present-biased (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2015).
Our main result reveals an important qualitative difference between screening by mode
of trade and the traditional forms of screening (i.e. intertemporal price discrimination)
examined by the literature. In Section 6 we show that, while there exists a lower bound
on the monopolist’s prior for which separation is optimal when trade is restricted to either
selling or renting, immediate separation of types arises for arbitrarily low priors if the
monopolist can screen by mode of trade. In other words, the common view, that a durable
good monopolist’s ability to screen customers is limited, might have to be abandoned in
settings where the choice between renting and selling can serve a screening purpose.
To understand why screening by mode of trade improves upon ordinary screening,
first note that a monopolist with a low prior would find it optimal to serve both types
of consumer if there was only one period of trade. In a dynamic context, heterogeneous
discounting introduces a wedge between the monopolist’s future gain from learning the
consumer’s type and the consumer’s future loss in information rent. As a consequence,
screening can become optimal even for priors for which pooling is preferred from a static
perspective. Because intertemporal price-discrimination (via pure selling or pure renting)
requires the first-period exclusion of the low-type, it is subject to a trade-off between the
monopolist’s static and dynamic objectives, making separation prohibitively costly when
the monopolist’s prior is low. Screening by mode of trade overcomes this trade-off as it
separates the high type from the low type while implementing first period trade with both
types.
To see that screening by mode of trade can be optimal for arbitrarily low priors, note
that, in the absence of asymmetric information, the monopolist would either rent or sell
to both types of consumer. Although renting jeopardizes future gains from trade, a patient
monopolist may prefer renting over selling because, from his viewpoint, the consumer’s
discounted present value of his product is too small. As screening by mode of trade entails
a sale to the high type and a rental to the low type, it comes at the cost of implementing
the wrong mode of trade with one type of consumer. When the probability of market
breakdown is low, the seller prefers renting over selling, so that not only the benefits but
also the costs of screening arise from the monopolist’s interaction with the high type. As
a consequence, screening by mode of trade can be optimal even when the likelihood of
encountering a high type is (arbitrarily) low.
An important feature of our optimal mechanism is the use of randomization. In partic-
ular, the optimal mechanism may mix between renting and selling to the high type. Our
4
theory thus demonstrates the sub-optimality of deterministic mechanisms (price-posting)
for a market where the mode of trade can be determined by the supplier. However, ran-
dom mechanisms have been criticized for being more difficult to enforce than deterministic
mechanisms (Laffont and Martimort, 2002, p.67). In Section 7 we therefore determine the
supplier’s optimal deterministic mechanism. We show that the mere posting of a rental
and a sale price is sufficient to obtain immediate separation of types for arbitrarily low
priors. It is reassuring that our main result remains valid even in settings where random
contracts are not feasible.
In summary, we can therefore conclude that in durable good markets, the mode of
trade can constitute a powerful screening device. With non-anonymous consumers, the
concurrence of selling and renting should not be seen as an indicator for the absence of
monopoly power (Bulow, 1982) but rather as a potential feature of it; especially for mar-
kets where alternative motivations for renting, such as liquidity constraints or preference
uncertainty, are less plausible.
Related literature. Although our theory is set in a durable goods framework, it relates,
more generally, to the literature on dynamic adverse selection, initiated by Freixas et al.
(1985) and Laffont and Tirole (1987, 1988). An important insight of this literature is that
intertemporal screening by time might be substituted by intra-temporal screening by menu
(Wang, 1998). The durable goods literature has employed a similar idea to show that in
anonymous markets, the Coase-problem can be mitigated by giving consumers the choice
between differentiated varieties (Ku¨hn and Padilla (1996); Ku¨hn (1998); Takeyama, 2002;
Hahn, 2006; Inderst, 2008). Most closely related is Ku¨hn and Padilla’s work on the si-
multaneous supply of a durable and a non-durable substitute. Our theory differs in its
approach (mechanism design) and focus (non-anonymous markets) and demonstrates that
the mere choice between buying and renting of a single product-variety can be sufficient
to obtain immediate separation of consumer types.
The conditions under which immediate separation prevails in our model – heteroge-
neous time preferences and possibility of market breakdown – are ubiquitous features of
real-world markets and constitute regular assumptions of the related literature on bargain-
ing (e.g. Rubinstein and Wolinsky, 1985; Binmore et al., 1986; Fudenberg et al., 1983;
Sobel and Takahashi, 1983). The significance of market breakdown for our results res-
onates well with the idea that enabling one of the parties to abandon the trade-relationship
permanently can overcome the Coase problem in a selling framework (Board and Pycia,
2014) or mitigate the ratchet effect in a rental setting (Gerardi and Maestri, 2018).
While selling induces a time-invariant consumption pattern, renting entails the possi-
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bility that consumption becomes “renegotiated” in the future. Laffont and Tirole (1990)
consider a two-period renting framework with a divisible good, where a monopolist can
offer long-term contracts that are subject to renegotiation. They show that the contract
designed for the high type induces the same (efficient) consumption level in both periods
while the contract designed for the low type becomes renegotiated.8 Although this pat-
tern bears some similarity to screening by mode of trade, an important difference is that
the low type’s consumption becomes renegotiated upwards whereas in our setting trade
with the low type is first efficient and then moves downwards (market breakdown). It is
the deferral of allocative efficiency into the future, which explains the power of the mode
of trade as a screening device.
Finally, our result that combining selling with renting may reduce distortions aris-
ing from asymmetric information is reminiscent of the idea that leasing can mitigate
the lemons problem in resale markets (Hendel and Lizzeri, 2002; Johnson and Waldman,
2003). Leasing contracts differ from renting contracts in that they entail the supplier’s
commitment to a future (selling) price. When lessees obtain private information about
their product’s (depreciated) quality, the associated option value is increasing in their val-
uation of quality. Hence, while both renting and leasing might serve a screening purpose
in a durable goods setting, the conditions under which they emerge as an alternative to
buying are markedly different.
2 Setup
Consider a monopolistic supplier of a non-divisible, durable product facing a single con-
sumer during two periods. In each period, the consumer has unit demand. The con-
sumer’s per-period valuation of the supplier’s product, θ, is constant over time and con-
stitutes the consumer’s private information. θ can take two values which we denote as
the consumer’s type, i ∈ {L,H}. With probability β ∈ (0, 1) the consumer’s valuation
is high, θ = θH > 0, whereas with probability 1 − β the consumer’s valuation is low,
θ = θL ∈ (0, θH). We call β the supplier’s prior belief and abbreviate notation by defining
∆θ ≡ θH − θL. A discussion of the effects of extending our model to allow for more than
two types and more than two periods is postponed until the Conclusion.
Our theory allows for the possibility that future trade-opportunities are not guaranteed
but are subject to uncertainty. In particular, we make the following assumption:
8Maestri (2017) finds that in the limiting case of an infinite horizon and no discounting, the low type’s
renegotiated contract becomes approximately efficient, thereby eradicating the monopolist’s ability to
screen customers. See also Strulovici (2017).
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Assumption 1 (Market breakdown). In between periods, the market breaks down with
probability 1− φ ∈ (0, 1), impeding further interaction between the two parties.
In case of market breakdown, the product’s allocation remains as determined previ-
ously. Assumption 1 therefore captures the idea that renting jeopardizes future gains from
trade that could have been realized through a sale. While the relevance of market break-
down has been emphasized by the related literature on bargaining (e.g. Rubinstein and
Wolinsky, 1985; Binmore et al., 1986), our model highlights its importance for identifying
the mode of trade as a screening device in a durable goods framework.
Payoffs are as follows. If in any given period, the consumer makes a transfer t ∈ ℜ to
the supplier, then the consumer’s instantaneous payoff is θ− t if the product is allocated
to him during that period. Otherwise the consumer’s payoff is −t. The supplier’s cost
is normalized to zero, so that the supplier’s instantaneous payoff is given by his revenue
t. The supplier and the consumer discount future payoffs with discount factors δS and
δC , respectively. We allow parties to differ with respect to their intertemporal preferences
and make the following assumption:
Assumption 2 (Heterogeneous discounting). The supplier discounts future payoffs less
strongly than the consumer, i.e. 0 ≤ δC < δS ≤ 1.
It will become clear (see footnote 16) that the analysis of the opposite case where
δC ≥ δS is trivial and it is therefore omitted. Although heterogeneous time preferences
are commonly assumed in related models of bargaining with asymmetric information
(Fudenberg et al., 1983; Sobel and Takahashi, 1983), the durable goods literature has
largely focused on the case of homogeneous discounting in order to allow for a better
comparison with the commitment case.9
Mechanism design approach. We employ a mechanism design approach with short-
term commitment to determine the supplier’s revenue maximizing trading mechanism.
The supplier lacks long-term commitment in the sense that, a mechanism can specify
monetary transfers and changes regarding the allocation of the supplier’s product only
for the current period. We use Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium as our solution concept which
requires that in every period the supplier’s offer must be optimal given his (potentially
updated) belief about the consumer’s type. From a methodological viewpoint, the main
9In models employing a dynamic mechanism design approach, heterogeneous discounting renders
the commitment-benchmark ill-defined when parties are able to commit to intertemporal transfers
(Kra¨hmer and Strausz, 2015). Heterogeneous discounting is a feature of theories considering a monop-
olist’s choice of product durability (e.g. Barro, 1972). Bikhchandani and McCardle (2012) assume a
patient seller in their analysis of behavior-based price discrimination in a non-durable goods framework.
7
novelty of our analysis is that we allow for mechanisms that may change the allocation
of the supplier’s product not only at the beginning but also at the end of the current
period. This allows us to determine the optimal “mode of trade”, i.e. the supplier’s
choice between renting and selling, as part of the mechanism design problem.
More specifically, in period 1 the supplier offers a (direct) mechanism which asks
the consumer to report his type by issuing a message m ∈ {L,H}.10 Conditional on the
consumer’s message, the mechanism specifies: a transfer tm ∈ ℜ from the consumer to the
supplier; a likelihood dm ∈ [0, 1] with which the product is delivered to the consumer at the
beginning of period 1; and a likelihood rm ∈ [0, 1] with which the product, conditional on
having been delivered, is returned to the supplier at the end of period 1.11 If the product
was delivered and not returned in period 1, the consumer enjoys the product in period
2. If the product was not delivered or delivered but returned, and if the market does not
break down, then in period 2 the supplier posts a price. Restricting to price-posting in
period 2 is without loss of generality because the supplier’s problem becomes equivalent
to a static screening problem for which price-posting is known to be optimal.
There are two notable features of our approach. Firstly, our set of feasible mechanisms
contains as special cases the selling mechanisms (rL = rH = 0) and renting mechanisms
(rL = rH = 1) considered by the existing literature. Secondly, and most importantly,
a generic mechanism in our model cannot be replicated via the mere re-definition of
an “allocation”, neither as a selling nor as a renting mechanism. To see this, let β˜m
denote the supplier’s updated belief about the consumer’s type conditional on his message
m ∈ {L,H} and let U˜ i(β˜m) denote the consumer’s second period gains from trade when
his type is i ∈ {L,H} (both to be determined in Section 5). Type i’s payoff from choosing
message m under our general mechanism can then be written as
U im = dmθ
i − tm + δC [φU˜
i(β˜m) + dm(1− rm)(θ
i − φU˜ i(β˜m))]. (1)
Note from (1) that a selling mechanism (rm = 0) and a renting mechanism (rm = 1)
differ in that only the former exhibits a direct, non-informational link between present
allocation and future payoffs. More specifically, while under selling, future payoffs depend
on dm directly, under renting, the consumer’s choice between dL and dH influences his
future payoffs only indirectly via its effect on the supplier’s updated belief β˜m. The reason
for this difference is that under selling, trade is an “absorbing state” in the language of
10Restricting attention to mechanisms with two possible messages is without loss of generality. See
Bester and Strausz (2001) and Doval and Skreta (2019a) and our explanations in Section 4.
11Note that we indicate messages by subscript to facilitate distinction from types which are denoted
by superscript.
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Tirole (2016), whereas under renting trade is non-absorbing. In our approach, the return
probabilities rm can be used to fine-tune this non-informational link between present
allocation and future payoffs. The supplier controls how absorbing trade is and can even
make trade with one type more absorbing than with the other by choosing rL 6= rH . It is
in this sense that our mechanism design approach extends the existing renting or selling
models.
3 Benchmark: Symmetric information
As a benchmark, consider the case of symmetric information, where the supplier can
observe the consumer’s type θ. In this simple case, the supplier cannot do better than
by either selling his product to the consumer in period 1 at a price of (1 + δC)θ or by
offering to rent in both periods at price θ. The supplier’s payoff from selling is larger
than his (expected) payoff from renting if and only if (1 + δC)θ ≥ (1 + φδS)θ. Note that,
in the absence of private information, the supplier’s choice between selling and renting
is determined by a simple trade-off. Renting jeopardizes future revenues in the event
of market breakdown while selling requires an excessively discounted price due to the
consumer’s impatience. Hence selling dominates renting if and only if the risk of market
breakdown is sufficiently large. We record these insights in the following observation:
Observation 1 (Symmetric information benchmark). Under symmetric information, the
supplier implements the same mode of trade with both consumer-types, by selling if φ < δC
δS
and by renting if φ > δC
δS
. From an ex ante perspective, the supplier’s expected payoff is
given by
V ∗ = [1 + max{δC , φδS}][βθ
H + (1− β)θL]. (2)
The payoff V ∗ constitutes an important benchmark for our subsequent analysis. In
particular, the comparison of V ∗ with the supplier’s payoff under the optimal mechanism
in the presence of asymmetric information, will allow us to assess the severity of dynamic
adverse selection in our framework and to show how the problem is mitigated by the
possibility of screening by mode of trade.
4 The supplier’s mechanism design problem
The first step towards the formulation of the supplier’s mechanism design problem is to
determine the expected future gains from trade, conditional on the supplier’s updated
belief about the consumer’s type, β˜. As the second period is the last, the distinction
9
between renting and selling ceases to matter. It is well established that the optimal
static mechanism consists of simple price-posting and it can be described as follows. The
supplier will post a low price θL, accepted by both types, when his (updated) belief is
such that β˜ ≤ θ
L
θH
. When β˜ > θ
L
θH
, the supplier will post a high price θH , accepted only
by the high type. The supplier’s expected future gains from trade are thus given by
V˜ (β˜) =
{
β˜θH if β˜ ≥ θ
L
θH
θL if β˜ ≤ θ
L
θH
.
(3)
The consumer’s future gains from trade are U˜L(β˜) = 0 for the low type and
U˜H(β˜) =
{
0 if β˜ > θ
L
θH
∆θ if β˜ ≤ θ
L
θH
(4)
for the high type. The supplier’s updated belief β˜ depends on the consumer’s (first period)
message m ∈ {L,H} and therefore takes two values, β˜L and β˜H , to be determined below.
In order to abbreviate notation we will let V˜m = V˜ (β˜m) and U˜
i
m = U˜
i(β˜m).
We are now ready to formulate the mechanism design problem the supplier faces
in period 1. Our analysis follows the machinery developed by the seminal article of
Bester and Strausz (2001). The main difficulty arising from the dynamic nature of our
setting is that we cannot focus on mechanisms that induce true type revelation, making
the evolution of the supplier’s beliefs become part of the mechanism design problem. To
allow for the possibility that types can be misrepresented, let qL < 1 and qH > 0 denote
the probabilities with which types L and H are induced to report message H .12 Note
that, without loss of generality, we can assume that qH ≥ qL, because if this was not the
case, we could rename messages. Denote the ex-ante probability that messages H and
L are issued by QH = βq
H + (1 − β)qL and QL = 1 − QH , respectively. Then Bayesian
updating implies that the supplier’s posterior beliefs about the consumer’s type are given
by
β˜L ≡
β(1− qH)
QL
and β˜H ≡
βqH
QH
(5)
and it follows from qH ≥ qL that β˜L ≤ β ≤ β˜H . The supplier’s mechanism design problem
is to choose a menu of contracts (tL, dL, rL), (tH , dH, rH) ∈ ℜ× [0, 1]
2 and an information
12It is possible to interpret qi as the likelihood with which type i is induced to select the contract
(tH , dH , rH), “designed for the high type”, from the menu of contracts {(tL, dL, rL), (tH , dH , rH)}. Given
this rather intuitive interpretation, we chose to focus our analysis on the likelihoods qi. Alternatively, we
could have formulated the mechanism design problem using the supplier’s corresponding posterior beliefs,
as shown by the recent work of Doval and Skreta (2019a).
10
elicitation strategy, qL ∈ [0, 1) and qH ∈ (0, 1], to maximize his expected revenue
V =
∑
m∈{L,H}
Qm[tm + (1− dm + dmrm)δSφV˜m] (6)
subject to the incentive and participation constraints
UHH ≥ U
H
L with equality if q
H < 1 (ICH)
ULL ≥ U
L
H with equality if q
L > 0 (ICL)
UHH ≥ 0 (PC
H)
ULL ≥ 0 (PC
L)
with U im given by (1). Note that the incentive constraints have to hold with equality
whenever the information elicitation strategy allows the consumer to misrepresent his
type.
We show in the Appendix that (PCH) is redundant and that at the optimum (ICH)
and (PCL) must hold with equality.13 Substitution of the transfers that make these
constraints binding
t∗∗L = dL[1 + (1− rL)δC ]θ
L (7)
t∗∗H = dH [1 + (1− rH)δC ]θ
H − dL[1 + (1− rL)δC ]∆θ (8)
−δCφ{[1− dL(1− rL)]U˜
H
L − [1− dH(1− rH)]U˜
H
H }
simplifies the supplier’s mechanism design problem to the following reduced program:
max
dL,rL,dH ,rH ,qL,qH
∑
i∈{L,H}
Qi{[di + di(1− ri)δC ]θ
i + [1− di(1− ri)]φ[δCU˜
i
i + δSV˜i]} (9)
−QH{[dL + dL(1− rL)δC ]∆θ + [1− dL(1− rL)]φδCU˜
H
L }
subject to dH [1 + (1− rH)δC ]− dL[1 + (1− rL)δC ] ≥ (DMC)
φδC
∆θ
{[1− dL(1− rL)]U˜
H
L − [1− dH(1− rH)]U˜
H
H }
with equality if qL > 0.
The supplier’s program exhibits the familiar trade-off between maximization of surplus
and minimization of information-rent left to the high type. The constraint is a dynamic
version of the monotonicity constraint, requiring “trade” with the high type to be larger
than “trade” with the low type.
13Standard arguments from static mechanism design only allow us to conclude that at least one of the
two incentive constraints must be binding.
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A number of features of the supplier’s optimal mechanism follow directly from in-
spection of the reduced program. Note that because U˜HH + V˜H ≤ θ
H , an increase in dH
increases the supplier’s objective (9) while relaxing the constraint (DMC). Moreover, it
is easy to see that the same holds for a decrease in rH when φ <
δC
δS
. Hence we can make
the following:
Observation 2 (No distortion at the top). The optimal mechanism sets d∗∗H = 1. More-
over, if the supplier prefers selling under symmetric information, i.e. if φ < δC
δS
, then the
optimal mechanism sells to the high type, i.e. r∗∗H = 0.
Observation 2 is reminiscent of the “no distortion at the top” result from static screen-
ing (e.g. Mussa and Rosen, 1978). Note however, that in our dynamic setting, allocative
efficiency requires the product not only to be delivered (d = 1) but also to never be
returned (r = 0). Because of the possibility of market breakdown, renting comes at the
risk of a reduction in allocative efficiency. Observation 2 shows that when the supplier
prefers selling over renting under symmetric information then he will indeed implement
the efficient mode of trade with the high type. In other words, any inefficiency in the
contract offered to the high type must be driven by an inherent preference for renting held
by the supplier and can therefore be understood as a simple consequence of heterogeneous
discounting. We will come back to this issue in our discussion of the optimal mechanism’s
allocative efficiency at the end of Section 6.
5 Screening by mode of trade
In this section we characterize the supplier’s optimal mechanism for the case where the
supplier’s prior belief is such that β < θ
L
θH
. The analysis of the remaining case, β ≥ θ
L
θH
,
is postponed until Section 8. We interpret the case where the supplier’s prior is low
as a “poor market” and talk about a “good market” when the supplier’s prior is high.
We analyze the two cases separately, because the supplier’s optimal mechanism exhibits
strikingly different features in these two types of markets.
Solving the supplier’s reduced program in (9) is a simple yet tedious application of
linear programming whose details can be found in the Appendix. In order to report the
12
solution we define the following thresholds
φ(β) ≡
δC(θ
L − βθH)
δS(θL − βθH) + β(δS − δC)∆θ
(10)
φ¯(β) ≡ min
{
δSθ
H − (δS − δC)θ
L
δSθH
,
δCθ
L
δSβθH
}
(11)
β ≡
δCθ
L
δSθH − (δS − δC)θL
∈ (0,
θL
θH
) (12)
where φ and φ¯ are decreasing and such that 0 < φ(β) < δC
δS
< φ¯(β) < 1 for all β ≤ θ
L
θH
.
Proposition 1 (Optimal mechanism). For β < θ
L
θH
, the supplier’s optimal mechanism is
characterized as follows:
• φ ∈ (0, φ]: Sell only: Pooling {(d∗∗L , r
∗∗
L ), (d
∗∗
H , r
∗∗
H )} = {(1, 0), (1, 0)}.
• φ ∈ [φ, φ¯): Rent to low type, sell or mix to high type: Separation, {(d∗∗L , r
∗∗
L ), (d
∗∗
H , r
∗∗
H )} =
{(1, 1), (1, r∗∗H )} with r
∗∗
H = 0 for φ ≤
δC
δS
and r∗∗H = 1− φ for φ >
δC
δS
.
• φ ∈ [φ¯, 1): Rent only: Pooling, {(d∗∗L , r
∗∗
L ), (d
∗∗
H , r
∗∗
H )} = {(1, 1), (1, 1)}, if β ≤ β;
Separation, {(d∗∗L , r
∗∗
L ), (d
∗∗
H , r
∗∗
H )} = {(1, 1), (1− φδC , 1)}, if β ≥ β.
Posteriors are β˜L = 0 and β˜H = 1 under separation and β˜L = β˜H = β under pooling.
Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of Proposition 1. In the shaded areas, the
optimal mechanism pools both types of consumer by offering only one contract; a selling
contract (d∗∗L , r
∗∗
L ) = (d
∗∗
H , r
∗∗
H ) = (1, 0) when the likelihood of a future trade opportunity is
low (φ < φ), and a renting contract (d∗∗L , r
∗∗
L ) = (d
∗∗
H , r
∗∗
H ) = (1, 1) when the likelihood of a
future trade opportunity is high (φ > φ¯). In the unshaded areas, the optimal mechanism
induces full separation of consumer types. Note that the optimal mechanism screens the
consumer in two mutually exclusive ways: (1) by decreasing the low type’s probability of
delivery d∗∗L below d
∗∗
H ; or (2) by increasing the low type’s probability of return r
∗∗
L above
r∗∗H . Both, decreasing dL or increasing rL are possible means to achieve the monotonicity
in “trade”,
dH [1 + (1− rH)δC ]− dL[1 + (1− rL)δC ] ≥ δC [1− dL(1− rL)]φ, (13)
necessary for separation.14 The possibility to reduce “trade” with the low type by renting
rather than selling is the novel feature of our approach, which becomes overlooked when
the mode of trade is treated as exogenous.
14In a separating mechanism, the consumer’s second period payoffs are U˜H
L
= ∆θ and U˜H
H
= 0 and
(13) follows from substitution of these payoffs into (DMC).
13
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Figure 1: Optimal Mechanism. The supplier’s revenue-maximizing mechanism in de-
pendence of his prior β ∈ (0, θ
L
θH
) and the likelihood φ ∈ (0, 1) of a future trade opportunity.
Unless noted otherwise, the optimal mechanism sets not only d∗∗H = 1 but also d
∗∗
L = 1.
The thresholds φ, φ¯, and β are as defined in (10), (11), and (12), respectively.
In light of existing results, the most remarkable characteristic of our optimal mech-
anism is the emergence of an interval of moderate market breakdown probabilities φ ∈
[ δC
δS
, 1 − (δS−δC)θ
L
δSθH
] for which the supplier screens the consumer (by mode of trade) even
when he is approximately certain (β → 0) that the consumer’s type is low. Screening
by mode of trade overcomes the obstacles for discrimination posed by the Coase problem
and the ratchet effect in that it induces immediate separation of types independently of
the supplier’s expectations.
To understand this result, it is instructive to compare the pooling-payoffs from renting
to both types, V RPool = (1 + φδS)θ
L, with the payoffs from screening by mode of trade,
which for the relevant range of parameters (φ > δC
δS
) can be written as15
V MTScreen = V
R
Pool − βφ(φδS − δC)θ
H + βφ(δS − δC)∆θ. (14)
Screening by mode of trade is costly because it entails the possibility of a sale (to the
high type with probability φ) although, as noted in Section 3, renting constitutes the
15The payoffs from screening by mode of trade can be obtained from substitution of dL = dH = rL = 1
and rH = 1− φ into (9).
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supplier’s preferred mode of trade when φ > δC
δS
. The benefits from screening derive from
the fact that, due to heterogeneous discounting, the supplier attaches a greater (future)
value to the consumer’s private information than the consumer himself. There is scope
for informational arbitrage and screening will occur when the corresponding benefits,
βφ(δS − δC)∆θ, exceed the costs of selling rather than renting, βφ(φδS − δC)θ
H .16 This
happens when both modes of trade are rather similar in the eyes of the supplier, i.e. when
φ ∈ [ δC
δS
, 1− (δS−δC)θ
L
δSθH
].
To understand why the choice between screening and pooling can become independent
of the supplier’s prior note from (14) that under screening by mode of trade, both the
benefits and the costs of screening are incurred with the high type, i.e. with probability β.
This distinguishes screening by mode of trade from ordinary screening with a single mode
of trade (see Section 6 for details). The costs of ordinary screening are incurred with the
low type, i.e. with probability 1− β, in the form of a reduction in first period trade. As
a consequence, separation becomes prohibitively costly when the supplier’s prior is low.
When the mode of trade can be used as a screening device, immediate separation can
occur within a durable goods framework, independently of the supplier’s prior.
The power of screening by mode of trade becomes most apparent when we rewrite its
payoffs in reference to the symmetric information benchmark V ∗:
V MTScreen = V
∗ − β(1 + φδC)∆θ −
{
(1− β)(δC − φδS)θ
L if φ ≤ δC
δS
βφ(φδS − δC)θ
H if φ ≥ δC
δS
.
(15)
The payoffs from screening by mode of trade are lower than in the symmetric information
benchmark because of two effects: (1) the mechanism leaves information rents β(1 +
φδC)∆θ to the high type and (2) the mechanism creates a distortion with respect to the
supplier’s preferred mode of trade. For φ < δC
δS
the mechanism rents to the low type
although selling is preferred in the benchmark. Similarly, for φ > δC
δS
the mechanism
mixes between renting and selling to the high type although renting is preferred in the
benchmark. Note that for φ→ δC
δS
both of these distortions become negligible and hence
the payoff from screening by mode of trade becomes equal to V ∗ − β(1 + φδC)∆θ. For
φ→ δC
δS
, screening comes at no cost beyond the standard information rent, i.e. screening
becomes as powerful as it can possibly get.
Finally, a comment is in order regarding the optimal mechanism’s use of random-
ization. The optimal mechanism may randomize with respect to the product’s delivery
(d∗∗L = 1−φδC) as well as with respect to the product’s return (r
∗∗
H = 1−φ). Interestingly,
16For an impatient supplier, i.e. for δC ≥ δS there would exist no informational arbitrage and hence
the optimal mechanism would consist of simple pooling.
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randomization is useful only for those parameters where renting constitutes the supplier’s
preferred mode of trade (φ ≥ δC
δS
). This result resonates well with the existing literature
which has found that randomization can be optimal in a renting framework but not in
a selling framework.17 Further discussion of this issue will follow our characterization of
the optimal deterministic mechanism in Section 7.
6 Ordinary screening
While many products can be rented as well as sold, there are cases where the mode of
trade cannot be freely determined by the supplier. For example, when a product requires
complicated maintenance it may be practical to offer it for rental only, in combination
with a service contract. On the contrary, when “proper” maintenance of a product is
subject to the user’s moral hazard, a sale may be the only practical option.
In this section, we determine the supplier’s optimal mechanisms when the supplier is
restricted to pure selling (rL = rH = 0) or pure renting (rL = rH = 1). Comparison
with the results of the previous section will allow us to highlight the main advantages of
screening by mode of trade over “ordinary” screening, with a single mode.
The characterization of the supplier’s optimal renting and selling mechanisms con-
tained in the next proposition makes use of an additional threshold:
βS(φ) ≡
θL(1 + δC − φδS)
θH(1 + δC)− φ(δSθL + δC∆θ)
∈ (β,
θL
θH
). (16)
Proposition 2 (Exogenous mode of trade). When the supplier is restricted to a single
mode of trade (rL = rH ∈ {0, 1}), he will refrain from screening unless his prior is
sufficiently high. In particular:
• The optimal selling mechanism pools, {(dSL, r
S
L), (d
S
H, r
S
H)} = {(1, 0), (1, 0)}, if β ≤
βS(φ) and separates, {(dSL, r
S
L), (d
S
H, r
S
H)} = {(0, 0), (1, 0)}, if β
S(φ) ≤ β < θ
L
θH
.
• The optimal renting mechanism pools, {(dRL , r
R
L ), (d
R
H , r
R
H)} = {(1, 1), (1, 1)}, if β ≤
β and separates, {(dRL , r
R
L ), (d
R
H, r
R
H)} = {(1− φδC , 1), (1, 1)}, if β ≤ β <
θL
θH
.
Proposition 2 emphasizes the main effect of imposing the supplier to use either selling
or renting as his sole mode of trade. In line with the findings of the existing literature, the
scope for ordinary screening is rather restricted, no matter whether the supplier operates
in a renting or in a selling framework. In both cases, the supplier decreases first period
17Randomization can be optimal for a monopolist selling multiple varieties. See for example
Thanassoulis (2004).
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trade with the low type in order to reduce the information-rent left to the high type. This
reduction comes at a loss of surplus and makes separation prohibitively costly when the
supplier’s prior is low. Screening by mode of trade overcomes this problem as it induces
separation while implementing first period trade with both types.
To improve our understanding of the difference between ordinary screening and screen-
ing by mode of trade, it is instructive to compare their payoffs in relation to the symmetric
information benchmark, V ∗. In our setting, allocative efficiency requires that the product
is allocated to both types of consumer in every period. Due to the possibility of market
breakdown, renting therefore constitutes an obstacle for efficiency. In order to focus on
the efficiency losses caused by the presence of asymmetric information, consider the case
where, in the benchmark, the supplier prefers selling over renting.18 In particular, let
φ < δC
δS
and compare the supplier’s payoff V MTScreen from screening by mode of trade in (15)
with the payoff from ordinary screening (via pure selling) given by
V SScreen = V
∗ − β(1 + φδC)∆θ − (1− β)(δC − φδS)θ
L − (θL − βθH). (17)
The two screening mechanisms leave the same information-rent β(1+φδC)∆θ to the high-
type consumer. Moreover, both mechanisms expose the low-type consumer to the risk
of market breakdown in period two, resulting in the reduction of the supplier’s payoff
by (1 − β)(δC − φδS)θ
L. Ordinary screening and screening by mode of trade differ only
in the term θL − βθH which accounts for the fact that the former excludes the low type
consumer from trade in the first period whereas the latter induces trade with both types.
Screening by mode of trade dominates ordinary screening by obviating first-period
trade reductions, leading to the first-best allocation of the supplier’s product in period
one. Hence, the increase in monopoly power that arises from screening by mode of trade
does not necessarily come at the cost of allocative efficiency. Instead, it is possible that
screening by mode of trade substitutes for ordinary screening, increasing not only the
supplier’s revenue but, at the same time, benefiting allocative efficiency.
7 Price-posting
According to our analysis in the previous sections, the supplier’s optimal mechanism
employs randomization, unless the mode of trade is restricted to pure selling. Both, the
optimal (unrestricted) mechanism, as well as the optimal renting mechanism randomize
18Remember from Observation 1 that, even in the absence of asymmetric information, the supplier
may choose renting over selling, thereby failing to maximize allocative efficiency, simply because he is
more patient than the consumer.
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the product’s allocation by either mixing between selling and renting, rH ∈ (0, 1), or
between delivery and exclusion, dL ∈ (0, 1). In practice, such randomization may take
the form of contracts that condition the consumer’s usage of the supplier’s product on
exogenous random events. However, stochastic contracts are more difficult to verify and
hence to enforce, and in some markets randomization might simply not be feasible. It
is therefore important to understand how the supplier’s optimal mechanism is changed
when contracts are restricted to be deterministic.
In this section we solve the supplier’s mechanism design problem under the additional
constraint that allocation and re-allocation probabilities must be either one or zero, i.e.
dm, rm ∈ {0, 1}. This constraint is equivalent to requiring the supplier to set a rental
and/or a sale price for his product in each period. Our subsequent analysis therefore
relates our theory to the earlier price-posting models, with the difference that, in our
setting, the supplier may choose to rent and sell. The following definitions are necessary
to state our result:
βPP (φ) ≡
θL
θH + φ(δS − δC)∆θ
(18)
φ¯PP (β) ≡ min
(
δCθ
H
δC∆θ + δSθL
,
θL − βθH(1− δC)
βδSθH
)
. (19)
Proposition 3 (Price-posting). Let β < θ
L
θH
. When the supplier is restricted to deter-
ministic mechanisms, i.e. dm, rm ∈ {0, 1}, separation is less prevalent but screening by
mode of trade continues to occur for arbitrarily low priors. In particular, φ¯PP ∈ ( δC
δS
, φ¯),
βPP ∈ (β, θ
L
θH
), and the optimal price-posting mechanism is characterized as follows:
• φ ∈ (0, φ]: Sell at price (1 + δC)θ
L, accepted by both types (pooling).
• φ ∈ [φ, φ¯PP ]: Rent at price θL, accepted by the low type, sell at price (1 + δC)θ
H −
(1 + δCφ)∆θ, accepted by the high type (separation).
• φ ∈ [φ¯PP , 1): Rent at price θL, accepted by both types (pooling), if β ≤ βPP ; Rent
at price θH − δCφ∆θ, accepted by the high type only (separation) if β ≥ β
PP .
The characterization of the monopolist’s optimal price-posting mechanism is depicted
in Figure 2. In terms of information-revelation, the optimal price-posting mechanism looks
similar to the fully optimal mechanism depicted in Figure 1. The only difference is a left-
shift of the threshold φ¯ and an upward-shift of the threshold β. The area of separation
under price-posting is thus a strict subset of the area of separation under the fully optimal
mechanism. This is intuitive, because a restriction to deterministic mechanisms affects
18
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Figure 2: Optimal Price-Posting Mechanism. The supplier’s revenue-maximizing
deterministic mechanism in dependence of his prior β ∈ (0, θ
L
θH
) and the likelihood φ ∈
(0, 1) of a future trade opportunity. The thresholds βPP (φ) and φ¯PP (β) are as defined
in (18) and (19), respectively. The dashed curves depict the corresponding thresholds,
β and φ¯, under the (fully) optimal mechanism. Restricting to price-posting reduces the
area where screening is optimal (unshaded) but leaves its qualitative features unchanged.
the supplier’s payoff from separation but not his payoff from pooling, making separation
less prevalent.
More importantly, even under the restriction to price-posting, screening by mode of
trade induces separation for arbitrarily low priors in an intermediate interval of market-
breakdown probabilities. Giving consumers the simple choice between a sale-price and a
rental-price constitutes a powerful screening-device, capable of substituting inter-temporal
discrimination by intra-period discrimination. It is reassuring to see that this insight
extends to settings in which randomization is not feasible.
8 High expectations
Until now, our analysis has focused on the case where the supplier’s expectations about
the consumer’s valuation were rather low, β < θ
L
θH
. In this section, we complete our
characterization of the supplier’s optimal mechanism, by considering the remaining case
of high expectations, β ≥ θ
L
θH
. The main insight we obtain is that under these more
19
favorable market conditions, selling and renting are never employed in combination. Our
theory thus predicts the concurrence of selling and renting for screening purposes to be a
feature specific to poor markets, where expectations about consumer valuations are low.
For β ≥ θ
L
θH
, the description of the supplier’s optimal mechanism requires a final
definition:
β¯(φ) ≡


(
1 + φδC∆θ
2
θL(θH+δCθH−φδSθL)
)−1
if φ ≤ δC
δS(
1 + φδC∆θ
2
θL(θH+φδSθH−φδSθL)
)−1
if φ ≥ δC
δS
.
(20)
Note that the threshold β¯ is decreasing and such that β¯(φ) ∈ ( θ
L
θH
, 1).
Proposition 4 (High expectations). When the supplier’s prior is high, i.e. β ≥ θ
L
θH
,
price-posting is optimal and the optimal mechanism implements either a rental or a sale,
but never combines both modes of trade. It is characterized as follows:
• φ ∈ (0, δC
δS
]: Sell at price (1 + δC)θ
H − δCφ∆θ accepted only by the high type (sep-
aration) if β ≤ β¯(φ); Sell at price (1 + δC)θ
H accepted only by the high type with
probability qH = βθ
H−θL
β∆θ
(semi-separation) if β ≥ β¯(φ).
• φ ∈ [ δC
δS
, 1): Rent at price θH − δCφ∆θ accepted only by the high type (separation)
if β ≤ β¯(φ); Rent at price θH accepted only by the high type with probability qH =
βθH−θL
β∆θ
(semi-separation) if β ≥ β¯(φ).
Posteriors are β˜L = 0 and β˜H = 1 under separation, and β˜L =
θL
θH
and β˜H = 1 under
semi-separation.
A graphical representation of Proposition 4 can be seen in Figure 3. The supplier sells
when the likelihood of future trade opportunities is low (φ ≤ δC
δS
) but rents when their
likelihood is high (φ ≥ δC
δS
). Note that the supplier’s choice between renting and selling is
the same as in the symmetric information benchmark, i.e. the mode of trade fails to be
employed as a screening device.
With respect to the degree of revealed information, the optimal mechanism is rem-
iniscent of Bolton and Dewatripont’s (2005) textbook analysis of the case where φ = 1
and δC = δS. In particular, the optimal mechanism either separates or semi-separates
types by inducing the high type to accept the supplier’s price either with certainty or
with probability qH = βθ
H−θL
β∆θ
. Semi-separation allows the supplier to maintain posterior
beliefs sufficiently high to charge the price θH in the future, thereby reducing the high
type’s information rent.
20
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Figure 3: Optimal Mechanism (High Expectations). The supplier’s revenue-
maximizing mechanism in dependence of his prior β ∈ ( θ
L
θH
, 1) and the likelihood φ ∈ (0, 1)
of a future trade opportunity. In the depicted range of parameters, the optimal mecha-
nism sets d∗∗H = 1 and d
∗∗
L = 0 (making r
∗∗
L irrelevant), and induces truth-telling (rejection
of the posted price) by the low type, qL = 0. The threshold β¯(φ) is as defined in (20).
To understand why, for high priors, screening by mode of trade fails to be employed,
note that for β ≥ θ
L
θH
the supplier would implement trade only with the high type in a
static (one-period) context. Ordinary screening (with one mode of trade) achieves this
objective by excluding the low type in period one. Ordinary screening is thus preferred
over screening by mode of trade which induces trade with both types in period one. Intra-
period screening via mode of trade substitutes for inter-temporal screening via time only
when there exists a tension between static and dynamic objectives.
9 Conclusion
In this article, we have determined the optimal supply mechanism for a monopolistic,
non-anonymous durable goods market. While we have made no restrictions on the set of
feasible mechanisms, the analysis was simplified by our focus on a two-period, two-type
framework. Before we summarize our main findings, we provide a brief discussion of the
potential effects of relaxing these assumptions.
With a continuum of types, the mechanism design approach employed in this article is
21
no longer valid.19 Resorting to simple price-posting, we have determined the monopolist’s
revenue-maximizing rental- and sale-prices for two periods of trade, when types are uni-
formly distributed on an interval. Screening by mode of trade, i.e. the simultaneous offer
of a rental- and a sale-price in period one, turns out to be optimal for most parameter
values. The market becomes segmented into three subsets of consumers, with high types
buying, middle types renting, and low types refraining from trade. We take this finding
as an indication that screening by mode of trade is not an artifact of our binary-type
assumption but can be expected to occur more generally.
Similarly, extending our two-type model to allow for three periods of trade, we have
been able to show that, under price-posting, screening by mode of trade continues to be
optimal when the likelihood of market breakdown is taken from an intermediate range.
Although the area of immediate separation is smaller than in the two-period case, we
suspect that even for long horizons there always exists a range of breakdown-probabilities
for which immediate separation via screening by mode of trade is optimal. The reason
is that in the vicinity of the breakdown-probability for which the supplier is indifferent
between selling and renting under symmetric information, screening by mode of trade
comes at zero cost.
In summary, the main message of this article is that a durable good monopolist’s ability
to screen customers is greatly enhanced when he can offer his products simultaneously
for rental and for sale. Screening by mode of trade dominates ordinary, intertemporal
screening because it substitutes the immediate exclusion of low valuation customers by
their potential and postponed exclusion in the future. By making the mode of trade a
variable of the monopolist’s mechanism design problem, we have shown that the common
view, that a durable good monopolist’s ability to screen customers is rather limited,
might have to be abandoned in situations where time preferences can be heterogeneous
and future trade opportunities are not guaranteed.
Appendix: Proofs
Derivation of reduced program. As θH > θL and U˜HL ≥ U˜
L
L = 0, (IC
H) and (PCL) to-
gether imply (PCH). Hence (PCH) is redundant. If (PCL) holds with strict inequality
then raising both transfers tL and tH by a sufficiently small and identical amount increases
the supplier’s objective while keeping all constraints satisfied. Hence the optimal mech-
anism must make (PCL) binding. Similarly, if both (ICL) and (ICH) hold with strict
inequality then raising tH by a sufficiently small amount increases the objective while
19Skreta (2006) and Doval and Skreta (2019a) provide techniques to deal with a continuum of types.
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maintaining both inequalities strict. Hence, at least one incentive constraint must hold
with equality. In order to derive the reduced program, we assume that (ICH) is binding
and then substitute the payments (7) and (8), that make (PCL) and (ICH) hold with
equality, into the remaining constraint (ICL) and the objective (3) to obtain (DMC) and
(9), respectively. To see that this final step is without loss of generality, assume alterna-
tively, that (ICL) is binding. Substitution of the payments that make (PCL) and (ICL)
hold with equality,
ti = di[1 + (1− ri)δC ]θ
i, i ∈ {L,H} (21)
into the remaining constraint (ICH) and the objective (3) leads to the following program:
max
dL,rL,dH ,rH ,qL,qH
∑
i∈{L,H}
Qi{[di + di(1− ri)δC ]θ
i + [1− di(1− ri)]φ[δSV˜i + δCU˜
i
i ]} (22)
−QH{[dL + dL(1− rL)δC ]∆θ + [1− dL(1− rL)]φδCU˜
H
L }
−QH∆θ{dH [(1 + (1− rH)δC ]− dL[(1 + (1− rL)δC ]}
+QHφδC{[1− dL(1− rL)]U˜
H
L − [1− dH(1− rH)]U˜
H
H }
subject to dH [(1 + (1− rH)δC ]− dL[(1 + (1− rL)δC ] ≥ (DMC’)
φδC
∆θ
{[1− dL(1− rL)]U˜
H
L − [1− dH(1− rH)]U˜
H
H }
with equality if qH < 1.
Note that the objective (22) is identical to the objective (9) of the reduced program except
for the last two lines and that the constraint (DMC ′) is the same as (DMC) except that
it must hold with equality for qH < 1 rather than for qL > 0. Choosing qH < 1 makes
(DMC ′) binding and the last two lines of (22) become zero, i.e. (22) becomes identical to
(9). Alternatively, setting qH = 1 allows (DMC ′) to be slack, but this makes the last two
lines of (22) become negative. In other words, for any mechanism that solves the above
program, we can find a mechanism that solves the reduced program and leads to (at least
weakly) larger payoff.
Proof of Proposition 1. From β˜L ≤ β <
θL
θH
we have U˜HL = ∆θ and V˜L = θ
L. We make
use of Observation 2 by considering the cases φ < δC
δS
and φ ≥ δC
δS
in separation.
Case φ < δC
δS
: Substitution of d∗∗H = 1 and r
∗∗
H = 0 into the reduced program gives
max
(dL,rL,qL,qH )
dL[1 + (1− rL)δC ]θ
L + (1− dL + dLrL)φδSθ
L (23)
+Q{(1− dl)θ
H + (1− dl + dlrl)[(δC − φδS)θ
H + φ(δS − δC)∆θ]}
s.t. 1 + (1− φ)δC − dL[1 + (1− rL)(1− φ)δC ] ≥ 0
with equality if qL > 0.
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If the supplier sets (d∗∗L , r
∗∗
L ) = (1, 0) then he pools by selling to both types and his payoff
is given by
V SS = (1 + δC)θ
L. (24)
If the supplier chooses (dL, rL) 6= (1, 0), then the constraint holds with strict inequality,
and hence the low type must be induced to report the truth, i.e. qL = 0. Moreover, as
the objective in (23) increases in Q, while neither the objective nor the constraint depend
any longer on U˜HH (because the mechanism sells to the high type), it must be optimal to
induce truth-telling also from the high type, i.e. qH = 1. Substitution of qL = 0 and
qH = 1 then leaves the following unconstrained program:
max
(dL,rL)
dL(θ
L − βθH) + (1− rL)dL{δC(θ
L − βθH)− φ[δS(θ
L − βθH) + β(δS − δC)∆θ]} (25)
+β[(1 + δC)θ
H − φδC∆θ] + (1− β)φδSθ
L.
Consider the threshold φ defined in (10) and note that β < θ
L
θH
and δC < δS imply that
φ ∈ (0, δC
δS
). For φ ≤ φ the objective in (25) is decreasing in rL and increasing in dL. Hence
for φ ≤ φ the optimal mechanism sets (d∗∗L , r
∗∗
L ) = (1, 0), i.e. it pools by selling to both
types, and the supplier’s maximized revenue is given by V SS. For φ > φ the objective in
(25) is increasing in rL and, after substitution of r
∗∗
L = 1, the remaining objective is clearly
increasing in dL. Hence, for φ ∈ (φ,
δC
δS
) it is optimal to set (d∗∗L , r
∗∗
L ) = (1, 1), i.e. the
optimal mechanism rents to the low type but sells to the high type. The corresponding
payoff is given by
V RS = θL + φδSθ
L + β{δCθ
H − φ(δC∆θ + δSθ
L)}. (26)
This completes our characterization of the supplier’s optimal mechanism for the case
where φ < δC
δS
.
Case φ ≥ δC
δS
: In this case an increase in rL increases the objective (9) while relaxing
the constraint (DMC). Substitution of d∗∗H = 1 and r
∗∗
L = 1 into the reduced program
gives
max
(dL,rH ,qL,qH)
dLθ
L + (1−Q)φδSθ
L +Q{rHφδSV˜H + [1 + (1− rH)δC ]θ
H (27)
+ rHφδCU˜
H
H − dLθ
H − φδC∆θ}
s.t. −dL∆θ − φδC∆θ + [1 + (1− rH)δC ]∆θ + rHφδCU˜
H
H ≥ 0
with equality if qL > 0.
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Accounting for the piecewise definition of V˜H and U˜
H
H in the following we consider in sep-
aration two possible types of mechanisms: Learning mechanisms which induce a posterior
belief βH >
θL
θH
; and non-learning mechanisms which induce a posterior belief βH ≤
θL
θH
.
Non-learning mechanisms : If (qL, qH) are such that βH ≤
θL
θH
, then U˜HH = ∆θ and
V˜H = θ
L, and the constraint in (27) can be written as dL ≤ 1 + (1 − rH)(1 − φ)δC . A
non-learning mechanism must set rH = 1, because for rH < 1 the constraint could not
be binding, and the low type would be induced to tell the truth, resulting in βH = 1.
Setting r∗∗H = 1 the constraint is automatically satisfied and the fact that it must hold
with equality when qL > 0 is equivalent to the requirement that (1 − dl)q
L = 0. The
problem simplifies to the unconstrained program
max
dl,q
H
dlθ
L + φδSθ
L + βqH(1− dl)θ
H (28)
whose objective is increasing in dL. Setting d
∗∗
L = 1, the corresponding mechanism
{(d∗∗L , r
∗∗
L ), (d
∗∗
H , r
∗∗
H )} = {(1, 1), (1, 1)} pools by renting to both types, and leads the payoff
V RR = (1 + φδS)θ
L. (29)
We have thus shown that for φ ≥ δC
δS
, V RR is the highest payoff amongst all non-learning
mechanisms.
Learning mechanisms : If (qL, qH) are such that βH >
θL
θH
, then U˜HH = 0 and V˜H =
βqH
QH
θH , and the constraint in (27) becomes dL ≤ 1 + (1− φ)δC − rHδC . If dL satisfies this
constraint with strict inequality then qL = 0 and the objective in (27) is increasing in dL,
because θL−QHθ
H = θL−βqHθH ≥ θL−βθH > 0. Hence d∗∗L = 1 is optimal if rH ≤ 1−φ
and d∗∗L = 1+ (1− φ)δC − rHδC is optimal if rH > 1− φ. Consider these two alternatives
in turn. If the supplier chooses rH ≤ 1 − φ, substitution of q
L = 0 and dL = 1 into (27)
gives the following unconstrained program:
max
qH>0,rH≤1−φ
θL + (1− βqH)φδSθ
L + βqH [rHφδSθ
H + (1− rH)δCθ
H − φδC∆θ]. (30)
From φ ≥ δC
δS
it follows that it is optimal to set r∗∗H = 1 − φ. For q
H → 0 the remaining
objective takes the value V RR whereas for qH = 1 the payoff becomes
V RM = (1 + φδS)θ
L + βφ[(1− φ)δSθ
H − (δS − δC)θ
L]. (31)
The corresponding mechanism {(d∗∗L , r
∗∗
L ), (d
∗∗
H , r
∗∗
H )} = {(1, 1), (1, 1− φ)} rents to the low
type but mixes between renting and selling to the high type. Alternatively, if the supplier
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chooses rH > 1 − φ then substitution of d
∗∗
L = 1 + (1 − φ)δC − rHδC into (27) simplifies
the program to
max
qL,qH ,rH>1−φ
[1 + (1− φ)δC + φδS − rHδC ]θ
L + βqHrHφδSθ
H (32)
− [βqH + (1− β)qL](δS − δC)φθ
L.
Note that the objective in (32) is decreasing in qL and supermodular in (qH , rH). Hence
it is optimal to set qL = 0 and to choose either qH → 0 and rH = 1 − φ or q
H = 1 and
rH = 1. The first possibility again results in the payoff V
RR. The second possibility gives
the payoff
V rR = (1 + φδS)θ
L + φ[βδS∆θ − (1− β)δCθ
L] (33)
and corresponds to the mechanism {(dL, rL), (dH, rH)} = {(1−φδC , 1), (1, 1)} which rents
to both types but separates by delivering the product to the low type with a lower prob-
ability than to the high type.
A straight forward comparison of the payoff from the optimal non-learning mechanism,
V RR, with the payoffs V RM and V rR of the two candidates for the optimal learning
mechanism completes our characterization of the supplier’s optimal mechanism for the
case where φ ≥ δC
δS
.
Proof of Proposition 2. To derive the optimal selling mechanism, substitute rL = rH = 0
into the reduced program to get:
max
(dL,qL,qH)
dL[1 + δC ]θ
L + (1− dL)φδSθ
L +QH(1− dL){[1 + δC ]θ
H − φ(δC∆θ + δSθ
L)} (34)
s.t. 1− dL ≥ 0 with equality if q
L > 0.
If qL > 0, then dL = 1 and the supplier obtains pooling payoff (1 + δC)θ
L. Alternatively,
if qL = 0, the program simplifies to
max
(dL,qH )
dL[1 + δC ]θ
L + (1− dL)φδSθ
L + βqH{[1 + δC ]θ
H (35)
−dL[1 + δC ]θ
H + (1− dL)φ(δC∆θ + δSθ
L)}.
Since the program is linear in dL, it must be that dL ∈ {0, 1}. Setting dL = 1 leads to the
pooling payoff. For dL = 0 the remaining objective φδSθ
L + βqH{[1 + δC ]θ
H + φ(δC∆θ +
δSθ
L)} is increasing in qH and setting qH = 1 gives the separating payoff
V SScreen = φδSθ
L + β[θH + δCθ
H − φ(δSθ
L + δC∆θ)]. (36)
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This payoff is larger than the one from pooling if and only if β ≥ βS(φ) with βS(φ) as
defined in (16).
To derive the optimal renting mechanism, substitute rL = rH = 1 into the reduced
program to get:
max
(dL,qL,qH)
dLθ
L + φδSθ
L +QH{(1− dL)θ
H + φ(δC(U˜
H
H −∆θ) + δS(V˜H − θ
L))} (37)
s.t. (1− dL)∆θ + φδC(U˜
H
H −∆θ) ≥ 0 with equality if q
L > 0.
For any (qL, qH) such that β˜H ≤
θL
θH
it must hold that qL > 0, U˜HH = ∆θ and V˜H = θ
L,
i.e. the supplier gets the pooling payoff (1 + φδS)θ
L. Alternatively, if (qL, qH) is such
that β˜H >
θL
θH
, then U˜HH = 0 and V˜H = β˜
HθH . The constraint must be binding, i.e.
dL = 1 − φδC , because for q
L = 0 the objective is increasing in dL. It then follows that
qL = 0 and qH = 1 are optimal and the supplier’s maximized payoff from separation is
given by
V RScreen = θ
L + (1− β)φ(δS − δC)θ
L + βφδSθ
H . (38)
This payoff is larger than the one from pooling if and only if β ≥ β with β as defined in
(12).
Proof of Proposition 3. As for φ < δC
δS
the (fully) optimal mechanism is deterministic,
we can restrict attention to the case where φ ≥ δC
δS
. Note first that the mechanism
{(dL, rL), (dH , rH)} = {(0, 0), (1, 0)} which sells to H while excluding L is dominated by
the mechanism {(0, 0), (1, 1)} which rents to H while excluding L. Similarly, the mecha-
nism {(1, 0), (1, 0)}which sells to both types is dominated by the mechanism {(1, 1), (1, 1)}
which rents to both types. The simple reason is that, as in the symmetric information
benchmark, for φ ≥ δC
δS
the supplier prefers renting over selling. Further note that for the
mechanism {(1, 0), (1, 1)} which rents to H while selling to L, the constraint (DMC) be-
comes
φU˜H
H
∆θ
≥ 1 and cannot be satisfied. In other words, the mechanism’s allocation is not
implementable. Given that d∗∗H = 1, the remaining candidates for the supplier’s optimal
deterministic mechanism are: {(1, 1), (1, 0)} (selling to H while renting to L) with payoff
V RS given by (26); {(1, 1), (1, 1)} (renting to both types) with payoff V RR given by (29);
and finally {(0, 0), (1, 1)} (renting to H while excluding L) which results in the payoff
V ER = φδSθ
L + β{θH + φ(δS − δC)∆θ}. (39)
Note that
V RR < V RS ⇔ φ <
δCθ
H
δC∆θ + δSθL
and V ER < V RS ⇔ φ <
θL − βθH(1− δC)
βδSθH
. (40)
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Hence separation by mode of trade is optimal if and only if φ ∈ [φ, φ¯PP (β)] with φ¯PP (β)
given by (19). The threshold φ¯PP (β) is decreasing in β and it is straight forward to show
that φ¯PP (β) < φ¯. Finally, for φ > φ¯PP (β) it remains to compare renting to both types
with renting to only the high type:
V ER < V RR ⇔ β < βRPP (φ) ≡
θL
θH + φ(δS − δC)∆θ
. (41)
The threshold βRPP (φ) is decreasing and converges to
βRPP (1) =
θL
θH + (δS − δC)∆θ
>
δCθ
L
δCθL + δS∆θ
= β. (42)
The prices specified in Proposition 3 can be determined from (7) and (8) via substitution
of the corresponding allocations {(dL, rL), (dH, rH)}.
Proof of Proposition 4. The proof consists of two steps. In the first step we determine
the optimal separating mechanism inducing posteriors (β˜L, β˜H) = (0, 1). This allows us to
show that for β > θ
L
θH
screening by mode of trade is dominated by ordinary, intertemporal
screening. The second step compares the payoffs of the optimal separating mechanism
with the payoffs from semi-separation (β˜L, β˜H) = (
θL
θH
, 1) and pooling (β˜L, β˜H) = (β, β).
As this comparison leads to results that are well known from the literature, it is omitted.
Details are available on request.
Focusing on mechanisms that induce (full) separation (β˜L, β˜H) = (0, 1) allows us to
set qL = 0, qH = 1, and U˜HL = ∆θ, V˜L = θ
L, U˜HH = 0, V˜H = θ
H . Substitution of these
values together with d∗∗H = 1 from Observation 2 into the reduced program leaves us with
the following problem:
max
(dL,rL,rH)
dL{θ
L − βθH − (1− rL)[φ(1− β)(δS − δC)θ
L + (1− φ)δC(βθ
H − θL)]} (43)
+φδSθ
L + β{[1 + δC(1− rH)]θ
H − φ(δC∆θ + δSθ
L − rHδSθ
H)}
s.t. 1 + (1− rH)δC − dL[1 + (1− rL)δC(1− φ)] ≥ φδC .
As βθH > θL, a decrease in dL raises the objective while relaxing the constraint. Hence
the optimal separating mechanism must set d∗∗L = 0, i.e. it must exclude the low type.
Screening by mode of trade (dL, rL) = (1, 1) is dominated by ordinary screening because
the supplier’s prior is such that serving only the high type would be optimal in a static
setting.
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